It was a “mission accomplished” moment for Vladimir Putin: In May 2016, he appeared on a screen set up at the sunlit remnants of a Roman amphitheater in Palmyra, Syria, and praised Russian forces before a renowned orchestra from his hometown held a concert in front of the ancient columns.
About seven months earlier, Russia had launched a major campaign of air strikes, a military intervention that was instrumental in saving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from potential defeat at the hands of opponents in the country’s civil war. It was a show, literally, meant to emphasize Russia’s new clout in the Middle East, part of a wave of propaganda that played up Moscow’s role.
In the wake of a stunning militant-led offensive that pushed Assad from power in less than two weeks — a pace that was in itself a reproach to Putin, whose apparent belief that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine would bring Kyiv to its knees in similarly short order was badly misplaced — Russia has been playing a far more subdued tune.
On December 8, which dawned with word that Assad was out after a quarter-century in power, some of Russia’s main TV programs made no mention of Syria at all, while some others made no mention of Russia’s role there.
The next day, with Syria’s future and the fate of Russia’s foothold there uncertain, the dramatic events of the past two weeks got much less attention in Russian newspapers — in their first editions since the news broke — than in many media outlets elsewhere.
In Rossiiskaya gazeta, the official government gazette, the front page was dominated by a huge photo and six-column story about Putin and his autocratic Belarusian ally, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, signing a security pact, with a headline that harked back to a battle in World War II.
Syria was below the fold, next to a feature about Cuba. And the guerrilla leader in a front-page photo was not Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, head of the U.S.-designated terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the offensive that toppled Assad — it was Che Guevara.
Without prior knowledge, a reader of that paper and several others might not realize that Russia had a major role in Syria for nearly a decade — a country at the heart of Putin’s efforts to challenge Washington and the West.
That context was not forthcoming from officials, either. The Kremlin said Russia had given Assad refuge and political asylum, casting it as a humanitarian gesture by Putin. But more than 48 hours after Assad’s ouster was confirmed, neither Putin nor Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had commented publicly on that or any other aspect of the situation in Syria.
And while Russia was not shy about claiming credit for Assad’s recovery following Moscow’s air campaign, media outlets have been busy assigning blame for his swift fall elsewhere — in particular, on Assad himself and on Syria’s armed forces, which they suggest melted away without a fight.In an article in the popular tabloid MK with the headline “A Knife Through Butter,” international editor Andrei Yashlavsky wrote that the failure to save Assad was a serious reputational blow to Syria’s “foreign allies,” but he suggested there was no point in coming to his aid on the battlefield.
“If Syrian Arab Army soldiers had continued to stubbornly resist…there would have been someone to help and a reason to do so. Alas, this did not happen.”
Russian bloggers who focus on military issues and the war in Ukraine also weighed in, some underscoring the embarrassment for the Russian leadership and others taking aim at the Syrian government and military.
“Syria’s fall is some kind of incredible quintessence of cowardice and betrayal [by] Bashar al-Assad’s entourage and the Syrian elites in general and the Syrian army in particular,” Sergei Kolyasnikov, aka Zergulio, wrote on Telegram.
On December 7, with Assad’s fate increasingly seeming sealed as his opponents closed in on Damascus, Lavrov found another frequent target for blame: the United States, along with the NATO alliance.
Speaking at a forum in Doha, he suggested the war in Syria was part of a part of a series of “aggressive adventures launched by the U.S. and its allies in Iraq, Libya, Palestine…. All this is a repetition of the old, very old habit of creating some havoc, some mess, and then fishing in the muddy waters.”
“We are absolutely convinced of the inadmissibility of using terrorists like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to achieve geopolitical purposes, as it is being done now with the organization of this offensive,” Lavrov said.Just one day later, Moscow was no longer referring to HTS as terrorists. In a statement on December 8, the Foreign Ministry said Assad had decided to leave his post and the country after talks with “several participants in the armed conflict.” And state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti quoted a Kremlin source as saying Russian officials were “in contact with representatives of the armed Syrian opposition, whose leaders have guaranteed the security of Russian military bases and diplomatic facilities on Syrian territory.”
That shift in wording, and the purported security guarantee, suggest Russia’s main motive for distancing itself from Assad is pragmatic: The Kremlin wants to maintain as much of a presence in Syria as it can as the post-Assad era plays out.
Another reason Russia may be wary about drawing attention to Assad’s demise is that it unfolded so quickly, evidence that a leader who seems firmly entrenched one day may be swept from power swiftly if the situation changes.
